This paper discusses Husserl’s theory of intentionality and compares it to contemporary debates about intentionalism. I first show to what extent such a comparison could be meaningful. I then outline the structure of intentionality as found in Ideas I. My main claims are that – in contrast with intentionalism – intentionality for Husserl covers just a region of conscious contents; that it is essentially a relation between act-processes and presented content; and that the side of act-processes contains non-representational contents. In (...) the third part, I show that Husserl also offers resources against intentionalism’s exclusive concern with propositional content. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows that (...) religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs. (shrink)

This article discusses “explaining away” arguments in the cognitive science of religion. I distinguish two rather different ways of explaining away religion, one where religion is shown to be incompatible with scientific findings and one where supernatural entities are rendered superfluous by scientific explanations. After discussing possible objections to both varieties, I argue that the latter way offers better prospects for successfully explaining away religion but that some caveats must be made. In a second step, I spell out how CSR (...) can be used to spell out an argument of the second kind. One argument renders religion superfluous by claiming that it results from a cognitive bias and one does the same by claiming religion was a useful evolutionary adaptation. I discuss some strengths and weaknesses of both arguments. (shrink)

Recently, research into gender differences in achievement has mainly concentrated on the underperformance of boys in comparison with girls. Qualitative research in particular points to the importance of the gender-specific cultures adolescents experience. The purpose of this article is to test quantitatively the explanatory value of academic culture with respect to the stated gender differences in achievement. Use is made of data of 3760 pupils in the third and the fourth year of secondary education in a sample of 34 schools (...) in Flanders (Belgium). A distinction is made between general schools preparing students for higher education and schools offering technical and vocational education. It is demonstrated that boys' culture is less study oriented than girls' culture and that this difference can be held responsible for the gender differences in achievement, at least in general schools. In technical/vocational schools, boys seem to oppose the study culture. (shrink)

Kant's Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten is popular as an introduction into his philosophy and into fundamental ethics in general. Its third chapter is, nevertheless, a notoriously difficult text. According to many interpreters, it raises questions rather than answering them. This article tries to answer some questions which often remain unclear even in the secondary literature: how is the logical structure of the chapter; what exactly is the synthetic character of the categorical imperative; how does freedom function as the third, (...) connecting term in this synthesis; what is the relationship between questions concerning the possibility and the validity of the categorical imperative? In his own words, Kant wants to give here 'a deduction of the principle of morality' but also of the concept of freedom. The double use of the term 'deduction' needs an accurate interpretation. One thesis of the article is that the deduction of freedom must not be identified with the problematic deduction of the categorical imperative. The deduction of the concept of freedom has a more modest function within the proof of the possibility of the categorical imperative. This means that the question concerning the proof of its validity is still open; but the very idea that such a proof is neither possible nor necessary evokes already the notion of the factum der Vernunft. (shrink)

‘Vandaag ga je toch niet hardlopen, met zo'n rotweer?’ Vraag van een collega aan een andere collega. ‘Natuurlijk wel,’ klonk het antwoord. ‘Net met dit regenweer vind ik het heerlijk om er eens tegenaan te gaan.’ Dat antwoord beviel me wel. Vorige winter heb ik het nog zo vaak mogen meemaken tijdens het fietsen. Een geselende wind, ijskoude regendruppels, opspattende modder: bij het begin van een trainingsrit roept dat vraagtekens op naar de zin van dit gedoe. Dat duurt hooguit een (...) uur. Dan worden je twijfels overstemd door wat je lichaam je zeer nadrukkelijk influistert: dit is genieten. Van binnen in je lijf lijken allerlei explosieve stofjes naar buiten te willen. Lijden als springstof. Een klein beetje doodgaan om je springlevend te voelen. Duursporters kennen die wijsheid van het lichaam. (shrink)

Some statements are called reflexive. For example, the statement : „ This sentence consists of six words”. The reflexivity lies in the fact that the statement refers to itself. Reflexivity in the sense of self-reference can be used systematically as a philosophical method. Usually the use of this method (as I explain in section I) leads to some form or other of scepticism. But in addition, and this is the point of the article, this method can be used as a (...) means of finding certain grounds (foundations). This is argued in sections II-IV by means of an analysis of the „ transcendental pragmatics“ of Karl-Otto Apel. (shrink)

Several recent analyses of torture focus on the humiliation torture inflicts on the victim as the principal evil inherent in torture. This paper challenges this focus by arguing that the connection between torture and humiliation is not a necessary one. Though it is true that most contemporary usages of torture humiliate, it is shown that this is dependent on both the context of the torture and the specific means of torture applied. It is demonstrated that, in certain circumstances, torture is (...) feasible without inflicting the humiliation contemporary accounts of torture identify. At a theoretical level, it may even be possible to use torture as a way of explicitly expressing respect. The paper, therefore, warns against hinging the entire case against torture on humiliation and argues that we should scrutinize other ways in which torture may violate dignity, too. (shrink)

In a 2002 article Stewart Cohen advances the “bootstrapping problem” for what he calls “basic justification theories,” and in a 2010 followup he offers a solution to the problem, exploiting the idea that suppositional reasoning may be used with defeasible as well as with deductive inference rules. To curtail the form of bootstrapping permitted by basic justification theories, Cohen insists that subjects must know their perceptual faculties are reliable before perception can give them knowledge. But how is such knowledge of (...) reliability to be acquired if not through perception itself? Cohen proposes that such knowledge may be acquired a priori through suppositional reasoning. I argue that his strategy runs afoul of a plausible view about how epistemic principles function; in brief, I argue that one must actually satisfy the antecedent of an epistemic principle, not merely suppose that one does, to acquire any justification by its means – even justification for a merely conditional proposition. (shrink)

Creatively operationalizing Claude Lévi-Strauss’ predicament that food is good to think with, I initiate a methodological conceptualization of food by exploring the ways in which it is apt to study Sri Lankan domestic and collective village life. Food is approached as an assemblage that is an emergent resultant of heterogeneous aspects with which it is deeply entangled and by way of which it turns into a potent agent shaping life. More specifically, I explore the vibrancy of these different components that (...) co-create the overall soundscape of food that as such becomes the conductor of Sri Lankan life. Food shapes domestic life by way of its preparation and consumption, and through its cultivation also conducts the collective rhythms at the village level. The conceptualization of food as an assemblage seeks to develop it as a methodology that opens up for a holistic integration and interdisciplinary collaboration. (shrink)

Occassioned by the recent publication of the Dutch translation of Varieties of Religion Today this critical notice tries to present and discuss Charles Taylor’s main arguments in that book. His treatment of William James and his historical assessment of our contemporary religious situation are thought to have enormous diagnostic value.